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Abstract
The book first sets forth the policies and practical considerations underlying the current in-
ternational and national trading regimes, including a description of what Professor Jackson calls
the “constitutional structure” of the national and world trading systems. In addition, the book de-
scribes the procedures and practices of dispute resolution. The international focus of the book is
largely on the GATT, with the bulk of the book devoted to a discussion of a number of important
substantive topics pertaining to the GATT. As the book points out, while a primary purpose of that
international agreement was to lower tariffs, which has largely been achieved, high tariffs are not
the only obstacle to trade between nations.5 The GATT also imposes a number of other obliga-
tions, the more important of which are discussed in the book, including the most favored nation
principle, the obligation of nondiscriminatory or national treatment for imports, the permitting of
actions against unfair trading (primarily dumping and subsidies), and the regulation of non-tariff
barriers to trade. Also discussed are a number of policies that compete ”with those of comparative
advantage and liberal trade,” including concerns with national security, protection of health and
welfare, and protection of the environment. The final chapters are devoted, respectively, to special
issues pertaining to developing countries and non-market economy countries. Professor Jackson
ends his book by summarizing what conclusions a reader may draw from the book and proposes
some corrective measures to ease problems in the international trade ”constitution.” In this regard,
Professor Jackson understandably focuses on the U.S. perspective.
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THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ByJ. Jackson.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989. xi + 417 pp.
ISBN 0-262-10040-1. US$45.00.
Reviewed by Edwin J. Madaj *
Professor John Jackson has few rivals as a scholar in the
field of international trade law, particularly with respect to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GATT"). As a
distinguished professor of law, former General Counsel of
what is now the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and a
consultant to Congress on GATT issues, he brings decades of
expertise in an arcane but important specialty of the law to his
new book on international trade law and policy.' His exem-
plary record promises an excellence that his new book unfortu-
nately does not consistently deliver.
The book is timely in light of the many important changes
now occurring in the field of international trade: the signing
and.,implementation of a Free Trade Agreement between the
United States and Canada, 2 and the possibility of the negotia-
tion of such an agreement between the United States and Mex-
ico; the possibility of expanded trade with Eastern European
countries due to the political liberalization occurring there; the
efforts to integrate more closely the economies of the twelve
countries of theEuropean Community by 1992; and, not least,
the negotiations being conducted as of this writing in the so-
called "Uruguay Round" of multilateral trade talks in Geneva.
While the book understandably cannot address the significance
of recent developments on all these fronts, it does describe
* A.B. 1977,J.D. 1980, University of Michigan; Member, D.C. Bar; Senior Attor-
ney, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washing-
ton, D.C.. The views expressed in this Book Review are solely those of the Reviewer
and not those of the International Trade Commission or of the General Counsel.
1. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989) [hereinafter WORLD TRADING SYSTEM].
2. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, entered into force Jan. 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). This agreement was implemented in the United States
on September 28, 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988).
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some of the history of the existing world trading system, as
well as the law and policies that form its foundation.
The book first sets forth the policies and practical consid-
erations underlying the current international and national
trading regimes, including a description of what Professor
Jackson calls the "constitutional structure" of the national and
world trading systems.3 In addition, the book describes the
procedures and practices of dispute resolution.4 The interna-
tional focus of the book is largely on the GATT, with the bulk
of the book devoted to a discussion of a number of important
substantive topics pertaining to the GATT. As the book points
out, while a primary purpose of that international agreement
was to lower tariffs, which has largely been achieved, high tar-
iffs are not the only obstacle to trade between nations.5 The
GATT also imposes a number of other obligations, the more
important of which are discussed in the book, including the
most favored nation principle, the obligation of nondiscrimina-
tory or national treatment for imports, the permitting of ac-
tions against unfair trading (primarily dumping and subsidies),
and the regulation of non-tariff barriers to trade. Also dis-
cussed are a number of policies that compete "with those of
comparative advantage and liberal trade, ' '6 including concerns
with national security, protection of health and welfare, and
protection of the environment. The final chapters are devoted,
respectively, to special issues pertaining to developing coun-
tries and non-market economy countries. Professor Jackson
ends his book by summarizing what conclusions a reader may
draw from the book and proposes some corrective measures to
ease problems in the international trade "constitution." In
this regard, Professor Jackson understandably focuses on the
U.S. perspective.
The book is at its best in describing the history of the
world trading system and the GATT, and in articulating the
substantive obligations imposed by the GATT. The book at-
tempts to leaven this rather technical discussion with colorful
examples, such as the one-time French requirement that im-
3. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Id. at ch. 4.
5. Id. at 40-41, 115.
6. Id. at 203.
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ported VCR's be imported through only one customs office lo-
cated in an interior city with a limited staff.7 One minor short-
coming of the book, however, is its cursory description of the
various national institutions that are responsible for making
trade policy. Most of the chapter on "National Institutions" is
actually devoted to a description of U.S. constitutional law and
a description of how trade agreements are negotiated and rati-
fied in the United States. This is very useful. Only one para-
graph, however, is devoted to national institutions in Japan,
and only two paragraphs are devoted to a description of the
various agencies in the United States having jurisdiction over
international trade matters, including the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury, and the International Trade Commis-
sion (the "ITC"). 8 The limited discussion of U.S. trade institu-
tions seems particularly anomalous given the long and
ongoing controversy regarding the fragmentation of U.S. trade
policy making among too many agencies. 9
A more serious problem is posed by the book's philosoph-
ical orientation, which at times affects the book's textual dis-
cussion and analysis. Professor Jackson states that he intended
the book to be an introductory text for "sophisticated readers
that can form the basis of their further work, study, and reflec-
tion" on the complex subject of international trade law and
policy.10 Thus, rather than a work arguing for a particular (and
identified) point of view in the trade policy debate, the reader
is promised a neutral exposition of the subject, reflecting the
perspective of a legal scholar," for policy makers, practition-
ers, and scholars.' 2 The book does not always live up to this
7. See id. at 131, 158.
8. Id. at 76-77.
9. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 169 (1987) (House
Ways and Means Committee Report on what became the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988) (noting lack of consensus among agencies responsible for
trade policy); C. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES 322-23 (1988) (calling for coordi-
nation among various committees in Congress and for administrative integration of
trade functions in executive branch); J. JACKSON, J. LOUIs & M. MATSUSITA, IMPLE-
MENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RULES 172-73 (1984) (noting past congressional dissatisfaction with lack of
effective organization on trade matters in executive branch).
10. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at ix.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at ix. This expectation is not diminished by the book's proposal to share
1990-1991]
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advance billing of objective scholarship.' 3 A more candid pref-
ace would have forewarned the reader that the work was in-
tended to advocate a particular point of view in the trade pol-
icy debate, which would have been a perfectly legitimate ap-
proach for Professor Jackson to take and one more in keeping
with the book he wrote. As it is, the Reviewer is compelled to
note a number of instances where alternative points of view are
slighted, a disappointment in a book that holds itself out to be
a scholarly text on the subject of international trade law and
policy. 14
Professor Jackson does caution that the book could not
detail all the intricate rules of international trade, although he
notes that the intention of the book is to set forth the "broader
purposes of international trade policy" and hopes that "the
notes will suggest sources of more detailed information about
many specific subjects that may be of interest."' '5 Again, the
premise is that the work will present a straightforward and ob-
jective exposition of the subject, and that the notes will guide
the reader to authorities on the various points of view ex-
pressed. Indeed, the footnotes to the book contain an impres-
sive array of references that reflect the depth of Professor Jack-
son's expertise. Unfortunately, the wealth of sources cited are
somewhat one-sided, and also reflect the book's central short-
coming: a failure to set forth consistently in an objective man-
ner the law and policies of the world trading system. Further-
more, sources or authorities that do in fact articulate alterna-
tive points of view are slighted, further contributing to the
book's lack of balance.
Specifically, the book emphasizes classic or laissez-faire
economic theory over competing economic theories or non-
economic considerations to a degree inconsistent with the
certain of Professor Jackson's "reflections and perceptions" that the reader may find
"provocative." Id at x. A neutral text may also make observations or proposals.
The proposals, however, should not color the discussion of the textual material.
13. Indeed, part of the problem even for a sophisticated reader is being suffi-
ciently on guard to distinguish the portions of the book, such as chapter 2 on the
GATT, that tend to be scholarly and objective, from other more partisan portions,
including several identified in this Book Review.
14. The Reviewer does not necessarily subscribe to these alternative perspec-
tives; the point is merely that a book of this type is expected to delineate them ade-
quately, and it does not.
15. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at ix.
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book's intent to be an introductory text. This orientation ex-
tends, in some instances, to the stating of some controversial
positions regarding U.S. trade laws without noting that they
may be controversial and thus failing to note or analyze con-
trary authority. Together, for this Reviewer at least, these
faults undermine the book's usefulness, notwithstanding its
other merits. At least some of these objections could have
been forestalled if Professor Jackson had written and separated
the book into two parts: first, chapters objectively setting forth
current law and policies of the world trading system, and sec-
ond, chapters containing Professor Jackson's more controver-
sial assessments and advocacy of laissez-faire free trade princi-
ples.
Also troubling is a problem that the book shares with
many other works on the topic of international trade: namely,
the propensity to use the word "protectionist"' 6 as a descrip-
tive term, and/or as a disparagement or an epithet for those
who subscribe to a different trade ideology. 7 This is unfortu-
nate, because the debate on international trade policy is be-
coming somewhat overheated,' 8 and discussions of trade pol-
icy are not improved by name calling. This problem is exacer-
bated when a potentially pejorative term, such as
"protectionist," is widely used but not well-defined, as is the
case with the book's use of the term. The term can refer to
policies foisted by special interest groups on governments
designed to prop up lazy and inefficient industries that are un-
able to compete with foreign competitors.' 9 More broadly, the
16. See, e.g., id. at 65-66 ("It is sometimes interesting to speculate whether the
Congress or the president has been more 'protectionist' . ... The 1988 Trade Act is
considered by some to be rather protectionist .... "); id. at 203 (noting "desirability
of ... preventing the protectionist use of a variety of ingenious import restraints").
17. One "tongue-in-cheek" example of a countervailing epithet for zealous free
traders that could be given is "GAIT virgin." See Pluckhahn, "GATT Virgins" in a
Panic, III THE INT'L ECoN. 65 (Mar.-Apr. 1989) (defining GATT virgins as "those
dour finger waggers who make their livings warning us that any departure from pure
liberal trade principles will trigger the downfall of the world economy as we know
it").
18. See Schlossstein, The New McCarthyism: Inside Washington's 'Apologist v. Revi-
sionist' Debate, IV THE INT'L ECON. 32 (Apr.-May 1990) (calling for end to ad hominem
attacks or name calling on part of both sides in United States-Japan trade debate).
19. See, e.g., WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note I, at 203. This is also the tenor
of Professor Jackson's statement, although he does not use the word protectionist, in
describing "general concern" (though on whose part is unspecified) about the U.S.
: 1990-1991]
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term can refer to any governmental measure whatsoever that
has an effect on importation, even to measures permitted
under the international trade "constitution" to counteract un-
fair trading practices that are condemned by the international
regime.20 A better approach would have been to define the
term. The best approach would be to avoid the use of poten-
tially pejorative labels altogether.
I. THE COMPETING POLICIES UNDERLYING THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM
As noted above, the problem is that the book's partiality to
liberal free-trade ideology goes beyond the occasional use of
the term "protectionist" in a disparaging sense. The Reviewer
does not object to Professor Jackson's stating his evident belief
that classic economic theory should be the primary basis for
international trade policy. 2' This would have been a legitimate
position to take in the trade policy debate. However, the prob-
lem with the book is that it barely concedes the existence of a
debate, let alone articulate the various positions. Although
Professor Jackson occasionally notes what he considers to be
non-economic policies, he fails to adequately flesh out these
other bases for trade policy, or does so in a rather disapprov-
ing fashion, characterizing them as second, third, or fourth-
best policy choices.22 Similarly, the book skims over economic
Congress' "vulnerability to narrow local constituency interests and certain powerful
lobbies." Id. at 304.
20. See id. at 17 (critically noting powerful political appeal of level playing field
rationale for antidumping and countervailing duties); id, at 255 (noting Canadian
shock at "contingent protectionism" of application of U.S. countervailing duty laws
to Canadian imports); id. at 257 (noting anger of domestic interests and Congress at
ineffective or hesitant application of countervailing duty laws prior to 1980).
21. See, e.g., id. at 19 ("More subtle is the possibility that a national consensus
could explicitly opt for a choice of policies that would not maximize wealth (in the
traditionally measurable sense, at least), but would give preference to other non-
economic goals."); id. at 203 (describing policies such as national defense, protection
of health and environment as competing with comparative advantage and liberal
trade policies).
22. See, e.g., id. at 7, 15. For example, even when describing the non-economic
policy of national security, the book discounts its importance by noting that to some
observers the overall economic well-being of a nation is more important than "tradi-
tional shorter-term goals of stockpiled war material or factories." Id. at 204. The
book is also remiss in failing to note that even those who view "overall economic
well-being" as part of the concept of national security may not subscribe to liberal-
trade policies. See C. PRESTowIrz, supra note 9, at 13, 239-40, 245-49.
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or other criticisms of classic laissez-faire economic theory as it
is applied to international trade.
The book, for example, devotes roughly one page to a
very brief description of the challenges to the central assump-
tions of the theory of comparative advantage that underlie free
trade ideology."3 This scanty discussion is short shrift, given
the importance that classic economy theory has for Professor
Jackson's approach to the policy underpinnings of the interna-
tional trading system, and the avowed purpose of the book to
acquaint the reader with the broader policies underlying the
international trading system.24 This is especially disappointing
given the extensive controversy that has surrounded what
some have criticized as a simplistic use of the theory of com-
parative advantage and classic economic theory as it is applied
to international trade.25 Indeed, some works published after
Professor Jackson's book could support an implication that the
book's adherence to classic liberal free-trade ideology and the
static theory of comparative advantage may be somewhat
dated, 26 particularly given the book's reluctance to discuss ade-
23. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 14-15.
24. At one point, for example, Professor Jackson merely notes that skeptical pol-
iticians have attempted refutations of the theory of comparative advantage. Id. at I 1
& n.22. He fails to articulate the refutations, or identify those making them, but
merely notes that he has observed the attempts. Id. at II & n.22.
25. See, e.g., C. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 9, at 230-37 (generally criticizing all
economists for opposing any governmental response to foreign trade practices); H.
SHUTr, THE MvTH OF FREE TRADE: PATTERNS OF PROTECTIONISM SINCE 1945, 5
(1985) (noting "fiction that world trade is governed by a system of rules which as-
sures the open and non-discriminatory exchange of goods and services" under
GATT); id. at 37 (noting "erroneous theoretical conclusions" resulting from reliance
on "simplified two-country models typically used by economists in the field of inter-
national trade"); id. at 172-75; Strange, Protectionism and World Politics, Ir'L ORG.
233, 235-45 (Spring 1985) (describing what she views as myths of liberal doctrine
and stating view that protectionism has not had much effect on world trade); F.
BRAUDEL, THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD 48-50 (Sean Reynolds trans. 1979).
26. See M. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 12 (1990). In his
book, Mr. Porter notes that
there is a growing awareness that the assumptions underlying factor com-
parative advantage theories of trade are unrealistic in many industries. The
standard theory assumes that there are no economies of scale, that technolo-
gies everywhere are identical, that products are undifferentiated, and that
the pool of national factors is fixed. The theory also assumes that factors,
such as skilled labor and capital, do not move among nations. All these
assumptions bear little relation, in most industries, to actual competition.
Id. (citations omitted); see Krugman, Protectionism: Try it, You'll Like It, IV THE INT'L
ECON. 35-36 (June-July 1990). Mr. Krugman explained that
3151990-1991]
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quately or even identify the criticisms made of these theories.
A book with the ambition of being a textbook cannot largely
ignore these criticisms.
The book also has a tendency to treat non-economic poli-
cies as implicitly inferior to the policies that would be chosen
by adherence to classic economic theory, although considera-
bly more space is devoted to describing at least some of these
non-economic policies. An extreme, but telling, example of
this treatment is the book's statement that a country's legal and
constitutional structure can cause it to choose the second-,
third-, or even "fourth-best policy options." 7 The reluctant
observation that a constitutional system must be allowed to
choose a fourth-best policy choice (i.e., non-economic) in order
to prevent "a monopoly of power or [to] preserv[e] a represen-
tative form of government"28 is hardly a paean to democracy.
In fact, it is almost an apology for the existence of democratic
governments because such governments cannot be relied upon
to choose the best policy choices (as judged by classic eco-
nomic theory), because, as democracies, they must reflect the
views of those who may not know what is best. Indeed, the
book reflects a suspicion of the U.S. Congress, the President,
and all politicians. 29 The book repeatedly expresses reserva-
tions about the wisdom of Congress' involvement in the mak-
ing of international trade policy for the United States, largely
because of the expressed view that it tends to cave in to "pro-
tectionist" pressures. °
[t]he claim that protectionism caused the [Great] Depression [of 1929] is
nonsense; the claim that future protectionism will lead to a repeat perform-
ance is equally nonsensical .... Among advanced countries ... protection-
ism at current levels is not a first-class issue . . . [D]efense of free trade
loom[s] so large on the public agenda [because] free trade is an important
touchstone for advocates of free-market economics.
Id. at 37. In addition he notes that "there are intellectually respectable arguments
suggesting that protection may, in some cases, actually be beneficial." Id.
27. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 25.
28. Id.
29. The book's advocacy of more aggressive direct application of "GATT law"
by U.S. courts could be viewed as consistent with an apparent distrust of the Con-
gress on international trade issues. See, e.g., id. at 67 (urging U.S. courts not to be as
deferential to either President or Congress in trade matters); id. at 75 (stating "key
parts of GATT are all domestic U.S. law because they have been proclaimed, and not
because they are self-executing").
30. See, e.g., id. at 34 (noting failure of Congress to approve International Trade
Organization charter); id at 65-66 ("It is sometimes interesting to speculate whether
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Examples of the book's philosophical orientation are
given by its treatment of two substantive issues that involve
considerations of non-economic policies. While recognizing
the non-economic policy of preventing degradation to the en-
vironment or of promoting public health, the book states that
an importing country should not "use border restrictions or
taxes to equalize the price of imported goods with domestic
costs of health and safety regulation" when the exporting
country does not impose such restrictions. 3' The basis for the
statement is the "dangerous potential" of the international
trading regime allowing such measures, which could result in
the possible extension of this principle to other types of "une-
qual" governmental regulation, such as minimum wage or la-
bor regulation.32 These proposed measures, the book notes,
"could be the basis of a rash of import restrictions, often de-
feating the basic goals of comparative advantage. ' 33 Instead,
the book counsels "at least temporary 'benign neglect,' with
the possibility that over time many of these problems will sort
themselves out as the necessity of health and safety regulation
becomes more apparent to more nations. ' 34 Thus, the best
choice is, in the book's view, to avoid tinkering with the GATT
system to allow governmental intervention because it might in-
volve interference with comparative advantage.
Similarly, Professor Jackson concedes that one of the more
the Congress or the president has been more 'protectionist' ... . The fact is that the
role of Congress in trade policy is extremely important, and to some, [whom Profes-
sorJackson does not specify] very troublesome."); id. at 257 (noting "anger" of "do-
mestic interests and the Congress" at ineffective or "hesitant" application of counter-
vailing duty laws prior to 1980, and characterizing Congress's interest as searching
for "ways to inhibit import competition"); id. at 302 ("U.S. Congress has strongly
pushed the U.S. law in the direction of mandatory import restraints, and this is pos-
ing certain threats to the liberal trade policies of the system. Part of the Congres-
sional impetus [is due to] the natural proclivity of members of Congress to please
particular constituents."); id. at 304 ("[T]here is general concern about the function-
ing of the U.S. Congress. Its vulnerability to narrow local constituency interests and
to certain powerful lobbies... is a worry expressed by many about the U.S. Constitu-
tion.").
31. Id. at 208-10. Note that in this case manufacturers in the importing country
are placed at a disadvantage compared to the exporting firms because the exporters
incur no (or fewer) costs inherent in environmental controls to the manufacturing
process.
32. Id. at 210.
33. Id.
34. Id.
1990-1991]
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perplexing trade-policy problems is the border tax adjustment
system under the GATF.3 1 Under that regime, a country is al-
lowed to rebate sales taxes or value added taxes upon exporta-
tion of a good. This is designed to prevent double taxation of
goods, which might be subject to similar taxes in the importing
country as well as in the originating country. However, rebates
are not allowed upon exportation of a good for direct taxes
that might have been imposed on the producing firm, such as
an income or corporate tax. This means that a producer sub-
ject to such a direct tax is arguably at a cost disadvantage for
export trade compared to a producer whose goods are subject
to a rebatable tax. Conversely, it is argued that "goods from
countries with substantial border tax rebates have not
shouldered their share of the costs of government, and there-
fore are in essence subsidized," compared to those goods
whose producers pay income or corporate taxes, which cannot
be rebated on exportation.36
The book opposes amending the GAT to provide for a
more equitable rule, arguing that "it is very unlikely that the
GATT will be changed."'37 Moreover, Professor Jackson de-
spairs of articulating a rule that would more accurately reflect
the advantages or disadvantages of a particular system of taxa-
tion, and offers the view that, in theory, the exchange rate will
adjust "to any border tax adjustment so that over a few years
(at least), most distortion effects of the BTA are neutralized."3 "
The only solution proposed is for nations to change their taxa-
tion policies to derive more income from rebatable indirect
taxes, such as a national sales tax, than from direct taxes, such
as an income tax. While the book concedes this can be viewed
as the "tail wagging the dog," the book states that "if such a
product tax system has other merit to commend it, it doesn't
hurt that a by-product might be lessened concern about per-
ceptions of unfairness of the international trade rules."3 9 The
35. Id. at 194.
36. Id. at 196.
37. Id. It is unclear whether this is because it is hard to amend the GAFF, or
because such a measure would not obtain sufficient political support in the GATT
community. If the former, the book fails to explore the possibility here of amending
GATT through the adoption of side codes such as was done, for example, in the
Antidumping and Subsidies Codes.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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book, however, fails to discuss the competing concern about
perceptions of unfairness of thereby changing national taxa-
tion systems to be based on what some characterize as more
regressive direct taxes such as sales or excise taxes.
The book's treatment of the policies underlying U.S. laws
also seems one-sided at times. For example, the book indi-
cates that the United States has over-used the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws because
the Congress has made that law so mandatory, limiting the
discretion involved in governmental implementation... re-
flect[ing] congressional suspicion of executive-branch im-
plementation of these laws, as well as the pressures of do-
mestic producers who are seeking to use the antidumping
laws as a way to limit the importation of competing goods.4"
This statement is a startling turn-around from Professor Jack-
son's praise of the "legalistic" nature of U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty laws in an earlier work.4 ' He does not ex-
plain what has caused him to change his view.42
Moreover, the book makes no effort to analyze changes
made in these laws over the years and show a correlation be-
40. Id. at 242-43. It should be noted here, as well as elsewhere, that Professor
Jackson implies that the ITC is not entirely independent of the executive branch. Id.
at 77. The implication is incorrect. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., 716-17 (1988) (explaining that ITC is "an independent regulatory agency");
Madaj, Agency Investigation, Adjudication or Rulemaking?-The ITC's Material Injury Deter-
minations Under the Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Laws, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM.
REG. - (Fall 1990).
41. SeeJ. JAcKsoN, J. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA, supra note 9, at 177-78. In prais-
ing the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty system, they state that
[i]ts openness, and its comparative objectivity, comparative insulation from
undue political influence, and comparative reliance on relatively detailed
published criteria [which] give foreign parties interested in exporting to the
U.S. a degree of predictable access to the market that may not be available
in any other system .... If liberal trade is the desired goal of the system,
such legalization may more efficiently promote that goal than systems that rely more
heavily on government discretion or nonpublic decision making.
Id. (emphasis added).
42. In another place in the book, Professor Jackson also states (with some ap-
proval) that "the U.S. statutory test" is "more precise and controlled than that of"
the international Antidumping Code, and expresses concern that the Codes contain
such "extremely broad and permissive language" as to permit material injury to be
found in virtually any case. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 239. This state-
ment is also in some conflict with the notion that the United States can be accused of
a "tilt" against imports through the use of the antidumping or countervailing duty
statutes.
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tween such changes and any increase in use of the antidump-
ing or countervailing duty statutes.43 Indeed, just a few pages
earlier the book notes that "practitioners who must appear on
these issues before the ITC" have indicated that the ITC has
retained such a degree of discretion that "it depends more on
who the particular ITC commissioners are, at any given time,
than on any statutory formula or committee attempt to define
that formula."14 4 The book's unsupported generalization that
changes in these laws have decreased agency discretion and re-
sulted in an increase in the use of antidumping and counter-
vailing duty proceedings fails to discount the possibility that
any such increase was due to an increase in exports that were
either dumped or subsidized,45 a factor that might have had a
role in causing more antidumping and countervailing duty
cases to be filed. The book also fails to note the dramatic de-
cline in filings of antidumping and countervailing duty cases in
43. The book states that "at least for dumping and subsidy countermeasures,
the U.S. Congress has strongly pushed the U.S. law in the direction of mandatory
import restraints ...posing certain threats to the liberal trade policies of the sys-
tem." Id. at 302. However, this statement is unexplained and is contradicted by
some changes made by that very Congress, such as requiring in 1979 that a material
injury test be satisfied before countervailing duties can be imposed, or by enacting
the "negligible import" exception to the doctrine of cumulation included in the Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Moreover, at least one commentator
has noted that the percentage of U.S. imports covered by antidumping or counter-
vailing duty investigations is comparatively minimal and has decreased in recent
years. See Stern, Regulating U.S. Trade and Foreign Investment, 21 INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 5
& n.23 (1989).
44. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 238. See generally S. REP. No. 249,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 58, 75 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at
46-47 (1979); H.R. Doc. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 435 (1979) (containing
statements of administrative action). Several cases have dealt with the existence of
the ITC's discretion under the statute. See, e.g., Metallverken Nederland B.V. v.
United States, 728 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989); Algoma Steel Corp. v. United
States, 688 F. Supp. 639, 643 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (noting that agency discretion as
to causation of material injury was not generally restricted by 1979 enactment), aft'd,
865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3244 (1989); Hercules, Inc. v. United
States, 673 F. Supp. 454, 479-82 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Hyundai Pipe Co. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 670 F. Supp. 357, 360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Maine
Potato Council v. United States, 617 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
45. The book also fails to explore whether the reason why the United States
imposes antidumping or countervailing duties more frequently than some other
countries may be due to the fact that the United States has one of the largest, rela-
tively "open" economies in the world, with a correspondingly large volume of im-
ports. See J. JACKSON, J. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA, supra note 9, at 102 (noting that
Japan had not imposed antidumping or countervailing duties in part because Japa-
nese import controls made such duties unnecessary).
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the United States since the mid-1980s and to discuss this fact
in light of the charge that the United States overuses an-
tidumping and countervailing duty procedures. For example,
the ITC instituted seventy-seven antidumping and counter-
vailing duty investigations in fiscal year 1986, forty-one in fiscal
year 1987, forty-eight in fiscal year 1988, thirty in fiscal year
1989, and twenty-five in fiscal year 1990.
II. U.S. LAWS AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
For those readers who may be less interested in the "pol-
icy" of the world trading system and more interested in the
"law" of such a system, Professor Jackson, as usual, masterfully
summarizes the basic principles of the GATT throughout the
book. Some problems arise, however, in the treatment of U.S.
law that pertains to international trade issues. First, the book
fails fully to reflect developments in the mid-to-late 1980s4 6
and erroneously states as unresolved matters that have already
been decided by the courts. 7 The book specially highlights
unfair trade issues in the context of the national and interna-
tional rules on dumping and subsidies, a topic of some impor-
tance in the current Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.48
Among the specific issues that the book discusses are the mate-
rial injury test4 9 and cumulation. Cumulation is the aggregate
consideration of the volume and effect of dumped or subsi-
dized imports from two or more countries in making a deter-
46. The book appears to be a somewhat haphazardly revised version of an ear-
lier draft. In some places the book seems to have been updated through "mid-
1988." WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 288. However, in other sections,
even of the same chapter, the book indicates that it is reflecting events of "early
1989." Id. at 294. This imprecision makes it difficult for the reader to know the
degree to which the book includes "late-breaking" developments in international
trade, a matter highlighted by the preface to the book, which notes that "[d]uring the
course of preparing this book, several important national statutes have been adopted
on the subject (particularly in the United States), and a new (eighth) trade round of
negotiations in the context of GATT has been launched." Id. at ix.
47. See, e.g., id. at 241-42; infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (discussing
erroneous statement of state of law).
48. To the extent that this Book Review focuses on the book's discussion of
antidumping or countervailing duty laws, it reflects the "comparative advantage" of
the Reviewer on this issue.
49. Under both the relevant international agreements and U.S. law, before cor-
rective measures in the form of a special duty may be taken, imports must be found to
be (1) dumped or subsidized and (2) such dumped or subsidized imports must be a
cause of material injury to a domestic industry.
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mination of whether dumped or subsidized imports are a cause
of material injury.5" The book is critical of the cumulation doc-
trine, particularly to the extent that it was made mandatory by
the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, but its discussion of the
doctrine is wholly negative. Based on this discussion, some
readers could get the impression that the doctrine has no ra-
tional policy basis, and is designed merely to engineer affirma-
tive determinations.5 ' Indeed, Professor Jackson fails to dis-
cuss or refer to the history of the cumulation doctrine and the
reasons why the doctrine arose in the early 1960s.5 2 A sen-
tence or two of explanation would have provided the reader
with a more balanced sense of the doctrine being criticized."
More disturbing from a legal point of view is that the book
states that "recently" an issue has been raised as to whether
dumped imports should be cumulated with subsidized imports,
and views this, as well as the entire doctrine of cumulation, as
troublesome. 54 In fact, the issue not only had been raised, but
had been resolved by a 1987 decision of the U.S. Court of Ap-
50. See, e.g., Madaj, supra note 40.
51. See WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 240 (stating that "it would be
much easier for the ITC to make an affirmative injury determination" and that re-
quirement imposed by 1984 Act that ITC cumulate in almost all cases "has in some
ways been insidious").
52. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1974) (Senate Finance
Committee Report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1974) (citing City Lumber Co. v.
United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 826, aff'd, 311 F. Supp. 340 (Cust. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 457
F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1972)). City Lumber affirmed a Tariff Commission injury determi-
nation, based in part on the fact that certain importers had recently imported
dumped cement from other countries. City Lumber, 311 F. Supp. at 349. The Com-
mission considered the price effects of the dumped cement in the investigation on
review in City Lumber in light of the fact that prices in the relevant marketing area had
already been depressed by these previously dumped imports. Id. at 343-44. "[An
investigation of imports from only one country, in disregard of the effect on the mar-
ket area in question of sales at less than fair value from other countries, would result
in a study and conclusions that would be myopic and unrealistic." Id. at 348; see
Madaj, supra note 40.
53, Further, the book states that an example of the insidious nature of cumula-
tion is that countries accounting for very small shipments of exports to the United
States may nonetheless be "lumped together" with larger traders under mandatory
cumulation. The book cites, in a footnote, the 1988 amendment to the statute that
now permits the Commission to consider whether imports from a given country are
"negligible," and if so, to exclude that country's exports from a cumulative analysis.
See WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 387 n.85. However, the book fails to
discuss or analyze this provision, or to assess whether this amendment obviates the
criticism made of mandatory cumulation.
54. See id. at 241.
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peals for the Federal Circuit.55 While the preface to the book
concedes that there is no way "that the latest details of the an-
tidumping law can be presented effectively in a book of this
type,"56 this does not explain this type of omission.
A similar error occurs in the discussion of another techni-
cal issue arising under the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws, the so-called margins analysis. This topic has been
the source of considerable controversy at the ITC for nearly
ten years. The purpose of margins analysis is to determine
whether imports caused material injury by comparing the size
of the dumping or subsidy margin to the average margin by
which the imports undersold the domestic like product.57 The
book makes a sweeping generalization that "[p]rior to 1982,
the ITC tried to show the causal connection between the ex-
tent of dumping or the extent of subsidization (the so-called
margins), on the one hand, and the material injury on the
other hand."' 58 The book fails to note, however, that two court
55. See Bingham & Taylor Div., Va. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482
(Fed. Cir. 1987). The Federal Circuit held that cumulation of dumped and subsi-
dized imports (so-called "cross-cumulation") that otherwise met the statutory criteria
for cumulation was mandated by the statute. Id. at 1486. The case is nowhere cited
in the book. Instead, in a footnote the book notes that the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 amended the statute to provide for discretionary "cross-
cumulation" in threat cases, as if that amendment left the question of cross-cumula-
tion generally open. See WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 387 n.86. It does
not. At the time of the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, the U.S. Court of International Trade had only just decided that the pre-ex-
isting statute was deemed to permit, but not mandate, cumulation for the purpose of
assessing threat of material injury. See Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de
Flores v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 1165, 1171-72 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), later pro-
ceeding, 704 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). In contrast, the Bingham &
Taylor decision, issued about a year-and-a-half earlier, made clear that the pre-ex-
isting statute mandated cross-cumulation. Bingham & Taylor, 815 F.2d at 1486. In-
deed, a provision of the House bill that would have explicitly made cross-cumulation
mandatory in all cases was dropped by the Conference Committee. See H.R. REP. No.
576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 620 (1988) (Conference Report to the 1988 Trade Act);
H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 129, 410 (describing House bill).
56. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at ix.
57. See, e.g., Hyundai Pipe Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 670 F.
Supp. 357, 358 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). Since approximately the beginning of 1987,
however, none of the commissioners that have considered the margin of dumping or
subsidization in their analyses on the effects of imports have engaged in this type of
"margins analysis" of comparing the margin of underselling to the dumping or sub-
sidy margin.
58. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 241. The stated date is faulty. The
last determination in which a majority of the ITC commissioners engaged in margins
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decisions have found no such consistent agency practice of en-
gaging in margins analysis. 59  The book merely indicates that
some unspecified persons have challenged whether the ITC
engaged in a consistent practice.60 The book also states (as if
the issue had not yet been addressed by any legal authority)
that "the United States government is obligated to use a 'mar-
gins analysis' in evaluating the material injury resulting from
dumping or subsidization, and that at the very best the U.S.
statute is ambiguous." 6'
The book fails to point out that six published court deci-
sions, all issued prior to mid-1988, have addressed this very
question.6 2 Yet, only one of the decisions is cited by the
book.6" All six court decisions have rejected the position that
margins analysis is mandated by the statute.' These decisions
analysis was in 1980. Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, USITC Pub.
1118, Inv. No. 731-TA-25 (Final) (Dec. 1980); see Hyundai Pipe, 670 F. Supp. at 361.
59. See Hyundai Pipe, 670 F. Supp. at 361; Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v.
United States, 669 F. Supp. 445, 466 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). The book also fails to
note that individual commissioners, though not a majority of the ITC, have contin-
ued to consider the dumping or subsidy margins in their analyses, although they do
not engage in "margins analysis" per se.
60. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 241-42. In fact, margins analysis
was used in perhaps fifty-three antidumping determinations under the Antidumping
Act of 1921, and in some determinations after the 1979 amendments to the an-
tidumping laws that became effective in 1980. See Hyundai Pipe, 670 F. Supp. at 361.
There were nearly 220 antidumping determinations prior to 1980. Moreover, the
"analysis" conducted by even the fifty-three determinations in some cases consisted
of no more than a one sentence mention of the size of the dumping margin.
61. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 242.
62. See infra note 64 (setting forth these decisions).
63. The lone case cited by the book is the Hyundai Pipe decision, cited as if it
were an unpublished slip opinion, and it is not discussed. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
supra note 1, at 241. Moreover, the book makes no reference to any of the Commis-
sion determinations that have discussed this issue.
64. See Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 639, 645 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988) ("Congress has not simply directed ITC to determine directly if dump-
ing itself is causing injury."), aff'd, 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3244 (1989); Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 564 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988) ("consideration of the margins is neither required nor proscribed by the
governing statute"); Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 669 F.
Supp. 445, 465 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (statutes "do not require the Commission to
find a causal connection between the foreign subsidies and the injury to the domestic
industry"); Hyundai Pipe Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 670 F. Supp. 357
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1985); Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 646 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1984) ("Our law does not go so far as to require that the subsidy itself be
shown to be the cause of injury") (emphasis in original).
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have also rejected the notion that either the Antidumping
Code or the Subsidies Code unambiguously requires a type of
"margins analysis," notwithstanding that the book finds this
"argument" that "some" have made to be "improbable." '6
-
One would have expected that the existence of this adverse au-
thority would be cited, so that the reader would have been
aware of the contrary precedent on this point, even if Professor
Jackson wished to argue that the cases were wrongly decided.
Similarly, the book is imprecise on the question of the do-
mestic law effect of the GATT. The book states that "U.S.
courts which have had to decide the issue of GAIT direct ap-
plicability have all held that GATT was part of U.S. domestic
law,''66 when in fact this is not entirely correct, as one of Pro-
fessor Jackson's own previous works indicates.67 Moreover,
the book fails to note that a large portion of the GATT, under
U.S. law, is inferior to either pre-existing or subsequent federal
legislation.6' This is an important limitation on the potential
65. Compare WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 242 with Algoma, 688 F.
Supp. at 645 and Copperweld, 682 F. Supp. at 563 and Alberta Pork, 669 F. Supp. at 466
and Hyundai, 670 F. Supp. at 360-61. But see Republic Steel, 591 F. Supp. at 646 n.9
(stating that Congress did not fully implement Subsidies Code and suggesting that
Code, though not statute, might require considering level of subsidy in assessing
causation of material injury).
66. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 75.
67. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS IN CASES MATERIALS AND TEXT 308 (2d ed. 1986); see also Sneaker Circus,
Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771, 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating, in suit to invalidate
"escape clause" relief imposed under section 201 of Trade Agreements Act of 1974,
that "[p]laintiffs' claim that the President's action violated the [GATT] ... is likewise
without merit [because] Congress has never ratified GATT"), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d
1290 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209, 1220 n.21
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (rejecting as "irrelevant" issue of consistency with GATT), aff'd, 437
U.S. 443 (1978); United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 575 n.2 (C.C.P.A.
1975) (involving challenge to President Nixon's imposition of import surcharge).
68. Part II of the GATT, which encompasses the bulk of the substantive obliga-
tions of the agreement, including the national treatment obligation as well as the
rules on safeguards and the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties, "is
expressly subject to pre-GATT federal legislation ... [and] is inferior to subsequent
federal legislation .... Thus, Part II of GATT is inferior to any inconsistent federal
legislation." Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 312 (1967); see Cementos Anahuac del Golfo, S.A. v.
United States, 689 F. Supp. 1191, 1200-05 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 847
(Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1318 (1990); Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT
in the Domestic Law of the United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187
(1986) (noting that no case has upheld claim that GAT obligation should be consid-
ered superior to U.S. federal law).
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applicability of GATT as part of U.S. law.69 It is particularly
anomalous for the book to be silent about this limitation in
light of its encouragement to U.S. courts to be more aggressive
in reviewing U.S. government actions pertaining to interna-
tional trade.70
Similarly, the question of the applicability in U.S. law of
other international agreements, particularly the "side codes"
such as the Antidumping and Subsidies Codes71 negotiated in
the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations ending in 1979, is also
an important one. Unfortunately, the book fails to cite or dis-
cuss the court decisions that have ruled on how to construe
U.S. antidumping or countervailing duty laws in light of the
GATT Antidumping and Subsidies Codes.7 2 It merely notes
(correctly) that it is "virtually certain" that U.S. courts would
find the Codes not to have a direct application on U.S. law.73
69. The book does generally allude to grandfathering of U.S. statutes under the
GATT. See WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 237, 257. However, many read-
ers could be expected to miss the significance of this allusion, particularly as this fact
is not highlighted in the section of the book that discusses the domestic law effect of
the GATT.
70. See id. at 67.
71. As the book notes, these "side codes" constitute a way of amending or ex-
pounding upon GATT obligations in light of the difficulties involved in amending
the GATT itself. See id. at 51-52, 55-57.
72. See, e.g., Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (Fed. Cir.)
("Should there be a conflict, the United States legislation must prevail."), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3244 (1989); Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 898, 902
(Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 859 F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Hercules, Inc. v. United States,
673 F. Supp. 454, 477 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Timken Co. v. United States, 673 F.
Supp. 495, 520-21 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 544
F. Supp. 901, 908 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) (stating that agency's first duty is to apply
statute and not "to assume a larger responsibility by looking beyond the law to the
codes or trade agreements it implements"). In addition, one case approved agency
action when that agency looked to the Code to provide guidance when the legislative
intent was otherwise ambiguous. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 618 F.
Supp. 496, 502 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
73. See WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 75; see also Timken Co. v.
United States, 673 F. Supp. 495 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (discussing non-self-executing
nature of Codes).
The book also argues for a direct application of the Codes as part of the legisla-
tive history of the statute. This is somewhat unusual because, in an earlier work,
Professor Jackson more carefully noted only that the Codes could be used "at least
[as] a secondary source of legislative history of the 1979 act when other sources fail to
resolve an issue." J.JAcKSoN,J. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA, supra note 9, at 167 (emphasis
added). The World Trading System is much less hesitant about the status of the Codes
as legislative history, and evidently views them to be at least on a par with any other
source of legislative intent.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, while the book is timely and represents a unique
attempt to blend discussions of trade policies with analysis of
national (primarily U.S.) and international rules of trade, it is
an experiment that fails too often. The excellent substantive
discussion of the international trading rules and history is
marred by the book's uneven discussion of trade policies and
U.S. trade laws, with the book moving from objectivity to advo-
cacy in an unpredictable fashion. While any book of this sort
will inevitably omit topics that a given reader might desire dis-
cussed, the topics that are chosen should be presented with a
degree of impartiality and precision that this book unfortu-
nately does not always provide. The need, however, for an
"introductory text" on the world trading system is imperative
in light of the many changes occurring around the world affect-
ing world trade. The reader can only hope that ProfessorJack-
son or some other author will try again to provide such a syn-
thesis in another book in the near future.
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